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Title:
Religious Rhetoric and the Evolution of George W. Bush’s Political Philosophy
Abstract:
This manuscript surveys George W. Bush’s public statements from 1993 to 2001 to examine the
evolution of his religious and political rhetoric. Bush’s personal religiosity and his use of
religious rhetoric during his campaigns for the presidency and in his two terms in office have
received extensive comment from the press as well as from scholars. Yet very little scholarly
work has considered the role of religion in his earlier political career. Although Bush had
evinced a deep and genuine evangelical faith for years before he launched his bid for governor,
he did not begin his political career as an overtly Christian leader. Instead, over the course of his
governorship, he gradually incorporated Christian tropes in his speeches to develop, explain, and
gain support for his “compassionate conservative” policies and to build rapport with voters.
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Religious Rhetoric and the Evolution of George W. Bush’s Political Philosophy1
On the evening of 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush addressed a shocked and
grieving nation, asking the public to pray for the victims who had perished in the terrorist attacks
of that morning. After quoting Psalm 23, he resolved to stand strong in the face of global
terrorism and called on all Americans to “go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and
just in our world.”2 The rhetorical links that Bush drew in this speech between freedom, justice,
and faith (in American strength and in God) presaged the foreign policy agenda that came to
define his two terms in office.3 Given the melding of religious and political values often
associated with his presidency, Bush’s call to prayer and action on 9/11 seems neither
noteworthy nor surprising. Yet the events of 11 September 2001 fundamentally altered the
toolbox of religious tropes that that George Bush drew from when expressing his political
philosophy; there is no evidence that Bush held messianic views about America’s role in the
world during his time campaigning for or serving as Governor of Texas.4 Indeed, his personal

1

The author would like to thank Melvyn P. Leffler, Brian Rosenwald, Molly Scudder, Christina Simko, and the two
anonymous readers for the Journal of American Studies for their invaluable feedback and suggestions.
2
George W. Bush, “Address by George W. Bush, President of the United States, Delivered to the Nation,
Washington, D.C., September 11, 2001,” in Vital Speeches of the Day LXVII, no. 24 (New York: The City News
Pub. Co., 1 Oct. 2001). President Bush quoted the first part of Psalm 23:4 “Even though I walk through the valley of
the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me.”
3
Bush described this agenda broadly as “seek[ing] the end of tyranny in our world” by spreading democracy abroad,
which he believed would ensure greater security and allow the American nation to control its “destiny.” George W.
Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” 31 Jan. 2006.
4
A number of authors have argued that 9/11 transformed Bush’s foreign policy vision and, therefore, the way in
which he and his speechwriters talked about American engagements abroad. Citing Jim Wallis, D. Jason Berggren
and Nicol C. Rae state that “the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington transformed Bush from the lamb into
the lion, from ‘self-help Methodist’ to ‘a messianic Calvinist,’” and suggest that “he believes that September 11 has
called him to lead the country to a new calling.” D. J. Berggren and N.C. Rae, “Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush:
Faith, Foreign Policy, and an Evangelical Presidential Style,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, No. 4 (Dec. 2006):
620; Jim Wallis, “Dangerous religion: George W. Bush’s theology of empire,” Sojourners (Sept.-Oct. 2003): 20-26.
See also David Aikman, A Man of Faith: The Spiritual Journey of George W. Bush (Nashville, TN: W Publishing
Group, 2004), 162-163, 171-173; Gary Scott Smith, Faith and the Presidency: From George Washington to George
W. Bush (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 397-98; Stephen Mansfield, The Faith of George W. Bush
(New York: Penguin, 2003), 136; Nancy Gibbs and John F. Dickerson, “Celebration and Dissent,” Time 165, No. 5
(31 Jan. 2005): 38-39; Frank Bruni, Ambling Into History: the Unlikely Odyssey of George W. Bush (New York:
HarperCollins, 2002), 256-59. Rogers M. Smith argues that Bush more frequently used and placed greater emphasis
on providential themes in his speeches after 9/11 than previous presidents had when discussing their policy agendas.
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piety notwithstanding, Bush seemed reticent to discuss religion in the early years of his
governorship.5 Rather, as the values that shaped his “compassionate conservative” agenda
became increasingly appealing to voters between 1993 and 2001, Bush grew more accustomed to
referencing his Christian faith to build and consolidate political support. Although the terrorist
attacks transformed Bush’s vision for America and the religious themes he employed to marshal
support for his foreign policy, his use of religious rhetoric to frame his policy agenda reflected
the evolving significance that religion had in the development of his political career. This
evolution, which corresponded with broader shifts in the US cultural and political landscape of
the mid- to late-1990s, is critical for contextualizing the salience of evangelical rhetoric in
George W. Bush’s presidential campaigns and presidency.
Bush’s personal religiosity and use of religious rhetoric during his campaigns for the
presidency and in his two terms in office have received extensive comment from the press as
well as from political scientists, historians, and other scholars. Much of this literature is
biographical in nature, tracing the familiar story of Bush’s spiritual awakening in the 1980s and
drawing connections between his evangelical faith and the types of policies and political
connections he developed while president.6 Yet even the more critical evaluations of George W.
Bush’s political career tend not to address the ways in which religion shaped his tenure and

Rogers M. Smith, “Religious Rhetoric and the Ethics of Public Discourse: The Case of George W. Bush,” Political
Theory 36, No. 2 (Apr. 2008): 280, 282-83, 285.
5
This, and his perceived political moderation, led some observers to question whether or not the religious right
would support him as a potential presidential nominee for the 2000 election. See Sam Howe Verhovek, “Is There
Room on the Republican Ticket for Another Bush?” New York Times Magazine, 13 Sept. 1998, 8.
6
For a selection of works that assess or discuss the relationship between Bush’s faith and his political leadership,
see Peter Singer, The President of Good and Evil: the Ethics of George W. Bush (New York: Dutton, 2004); James
L. Guth, “George W. Bush and Religious Politics,” in High Risk and Big Ambition: the Presidency of George W.
Bush, ed. Steven E. Schier (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 117-41; Joseph M. Knippenberg, “The
Personal is (Not?) the Political: The Role of Religion in the Presidency of George W. Bush,” in Civil Religion In
Political Thought: Its Perennial Questions and Enduring Relevance In North America, ed. Ronald L. Weed and
John von Heyking (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 262-79; Aikman, A Man of
Faith; Gary Scott Smith, 368-71; Mansfield, The Faith of George W. Bush.
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legislative agenda as governor of Texas.7 This is a crucial oversight. Although Bush gained some
political experience through his failed 1978 congressional campaign and as an informal aide and
liaison to the Christian right during George H. W. Bush’s 1988 presidential bid, he did not begin
to forge an effective personal political identity or leadership style until his successful campaigns
for and time as governor. Indeed, Bush’s viability as a presidential candidate derived, in part,
from the political capital and national visibility he built through the legislative successes of his
governorship. As such, examining the ways in which Bush utilized—or, at times, eschewed—
religious language and moral justifications for his decision-making as a governor sheds
considerable light on how and why he adopted overt evangelical rhetoric while running for and
serving as president.
Assessing George W. Bush’s evolving use of religious rhetoric also illuminates the
challenges that Republicans faced in attempting to balance the competing agendas of social and
economic conservatives as the party returned to and sought to hold congressional (and later
executive) power in the mid- to late-1990s. Although he cultivated close ties with the religious
right during his presidential campaigns, Bush often prioritized economic policy over
conservative social issues once in office.8 Nevertheless, his identification with the Christian right
remained strong throughout his presidency, and the compassionate conservative political

7

For example, in his excellent chapter on religion and the George W. Bush presidency, historian Kevin Kruse notes
that Bush entered the campaign for president seeking to put “a kinder, gentler face” on conservatism, and noted that
the fact that “his faith formed an essential part of both his private character and his public persona” made him
particularly well suited to this task. Kruse does not, however, address how Bush had developed that outwardly
religious public (and political) persona during his governorship, he simply states that he employed this persona to
good effect in building connections with key constituent groups while campaigning for the presidency. See Kevin
M. Kruse, “Compassionate Conservatism: Religion in the Age of George W. Bush,” in The Presidency of George W.
Bush: A First Historical Assessment ed. Julian E. Zelizer (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010): 229.
Likewise, in his analysis of Bush’s governorship, Brian McCall offers little in the way of discussion about how Bush
drew on religion to shape his legislative agenda in Texas. Brian McCall, The Power of the Texas Governor:
Connally to Bush (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2009).
8
John W. Wells and David B. Cohen, “Keeping the Charge: George W. Bush, the Christian Right, and the New
Vital Center of American Politics,” in Religion and the Bush Presidency, ed. Mark J. Rozell and Gleaves Whitney
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 147-48.
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philosophy that he espoused enabled him to appeal to the interests of a wide range of
conservative and independent voters.9 Exploring how Bush employed religious rhetoric to
navigate the fault lines within his party illustrates the latent fragility and disunity of late
twentieth century conservatism, a topic which historian Julian Zelizer suggests represents a
potential “third wave of historical scholarship on modern conservatism.”10 At the same time, the
Republican Revolution of 1994 and George W. Bush’s election as president speaks to the
durability of conservative ideology and the power of grassroots Christian and conservative
organizing to shape the political discourse of the nation. Examining the manner in which Bush
adapted his rhetoric and political persona to suit the changing needs of the Republican Party, in
Texas as well as nationally, is key not only to understanding his use of religious language as
president, but the nature of American conservatism at the turn of the twenty-first century as well.
When George W. Bush announced his candidacy for governor of Texas in 1993, his
evangelical faith received little if any discussion in the press. Between the formal declaration of
his intention to run against Democratic incumbent Ann Richards on November 8, 1993 and his

Ibid. Political scientists Wells and Cohen argue that “Bush has used the social issues agenda of the Christian Right
to facilitate a kind of triangulation in American politics ,” in order to enhance the appeal of the Republican party to
moderate and independent voters and thus attempt to build a “big tent” party.
10
Julian E. Zelizer, “Reflections: Rethinking the History of American Conservatism,” Reviews in American History
38, No. 2 (June 2010): 387. Briefly, Zelizer posits that the first wave of scholarship on conservatism focused on the
elite, intellectual history of the movement and the second wave on grassroots conservative activism. For major
works of the first wave see George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (New
York: Basic Books, 1976), as well as the more recent Patrick Allit, The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities
Throughout American History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). On the second wave, see Lisa McGirr,
Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001);
Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2005); Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2007); Donald T. Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political
History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). For recent work that might be included in the new third
wave, see David T. Courtwright, No Right Turn: Conservative Politics in a Liberal America (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2010). Select literature on the rise of the religious right as part of the conservative
ascendancy includes William C. Martin, With God On Our Side: the Rise of the Religious Right In America (New
York: Broadway Books, 1996); Paul Boyer, “The Evangelical Resurgence in 1970s American Protestantism,” in
Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s, ed. Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 29–51; Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-folk
Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).
9
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victory in the election one year later, Bush rarely even mentioned religion. He focused instead on
four core issues: education, welfare reform, juvenile crime, and tort reform.11 He called for
independence for local school districts to enable them to set their own education standards “and
release them from what he call[ed] ‘burdensome state regulations.’”12 Hewing to conservative
lines, Bush expressed concern about high taxes, dependency on welfare, and the growth of the
state government.13 In particular, he emphasized his vision for instilling more personal
accountability in Texas, which he planned to foster by slashing welfare and creating harsher
punishments for criminals. As one journalist noted, “the kind of government Bush says he
prefers is one that creates ‘negative reinforcement’ to make people change their behavior.”14
Bush campaigned on a platform of change, distinguishing himself from Governor Richards,
whom he criticized for supporting “big government, increased spending and centralized control
by government bureaucracy.”15 His issue-drive campaign did not rely on, or utilize, religious
rhetoric to win over voters. Despite Richards’ popularity among Texas voters, and her
challenger’s lack of political experience, Bush and Richards remained neck and neck throughout
the campaign.

See, for example, Hugh Aynesworth, “Bush son puts hat in ring, admits Richards is liked,” The Washington
Times, 9 Nov. 1993, A3; R.G. Ratcliffe, “George W. Bush: From the golf course to the boardroom, the GOP
candidate banks on his desire,” Houston Chronicle, 20 Oct. 1994, Voter’s Guide, 9.
12
James E. Garcia, “Bush backs home-rule plan for schools,” Austin American-Statesman, 22 Feb. 1994.
13
Aynesworth, “Bush”; Stuart Eskenazi, “Bush Pitches Shutout; Anti-Democrat Fervor Helps,” Austin AmericanStatesman, 9 Nov. 1994.
14
Skip Hollandsworth, “Born to Run,” Texas Monthly 22, No. 5 (May 1994): 112-27. In this article, Bush also stated
that, “‘A governor can't pass a law to make you love. . . . But he can pass a law to protect the innocent, law-abiding
citizens from thugs.’” This language about the inability to inculcate love through legislation appeared again during
his governorship when promoting faith-based initiatives, which I address later in this essay. Given the centrality of
love (or loving others as God loves) to Christianity (see, for example, 1 Jn 4:9-10; 1 Jn 3:16), this might be read as a
persistent religious trope that appeared early in Bush’s political rhetoric.
15
Robbie Morganfield, “Texas Governor's Race; Bush cites foe's ‘failed leadership,’” The Houston Chronicle, 4
Nov. 1994, A1.
11
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Still, in early 1994, divisions emerged within the Texas GOP over issues of interest to the
religious right that had the potential to threaten Bush’s political fortunes. The rift received
considerable press coverage. As one Star Telegram article noted:
Civil war now looms between members of the Christian right, who generally focus on issues like abortion,
and mainstream Republicans traditionally more concerned with economics. . . . Many mainstream
Republicans view the grassroots coup with alarm and anger, although they are often reluctant to express the
reactions publicly for fear of antagonizing the conservative Christians.16

Bush aimed to distance himself “from [the] battle lines of [the] state GOP’s internal war,” partly
by striking an “accommodating stance” on abortion; he noted his acceptance of Supreme Court
rulings on the issue while maintaining that as governor he would promote policies “to encourage
fewer abortions.”17 Though openly pro-life, and supportive of legislation requiring parental
consent for minors seeking abortions, media coverage of his responses to this issue suggests that
he tried to avoid discussing his views on abortion when possible to keep from alienating voters.18
Just as he sought to downplay the divisive issues that religious conservatives within the
Texas Republican party promoted, Bush also worked assiduously during the campaign to refrain
from making overt references to religion, emphasizing his belief that religion and politics should
not mix. He spent the Sunday before the 1994 election worshiping at his own church, rather than
making the customary final campaign appearances at other churches throughout the state. After
the service, he made a statement to the press about the role of religion in his life. According to
the Houston Chronicle:
Bush called his own religious faith important but personal. ‘I've been very careful about not trying to
campaign as a more godly candidate,’ he said. ‘I just don't agree with that. I don't agree with mixing
religion in political campaigns. . . . But in my personal life and in my daily walk, my relationship with God
is important. I believe in prayer. And I believe I can receive strength and sustenance from the Lord by
praying to the Lord.’19
Tim Madigan, “Christian right gaining clout within GOP,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 5 Jun. 1994, 1, 20.
“50 State Report – Texas: Dem. Convo. Pushes GOP as Party of ‘Religious Right,’” National Journal Hotline, 6
Jun. 1994; “Politics – Rightward March?” National Journal Hotline, 6 Aug. 1994.
18
“Governors ‘94 – Texas: Richards Pushes Buttons on Abortion, Race,” National Journal Hotline, 24 Oct. 1994.
19
Robbie Morganfield, “Campaign ‘94; Governor race down to wire; Confident Bush goes to church,” The Houston
Chronicle, 7 Nov. 1994, A1. Bush later stated that he avoided talk of religion because after one occasion when he
16
17
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Bush thus affirmed the depth of his faith while also intimating that he honored the separation of
church and state. This statement, in conjunction with his reluctance to discuss his religious
beliefs during the campaign, provides a valuable benchmark for measuring how Bush’s use of
religious rhetoric and his conception of the relationship between faith and policy changed over
the course of his political career.
Bush won the 1994 gubernatorial election by a considerable margin, and set to work
immediately to achieve the conservative policy objectives he outlined during his campaign.20 In
his State of the State address to the Texas legislature in February 1995, he urged lawmakers to
promote what he referred to as their shared “Texas values,” which included personal
responsibility, local rather than state control of schools, and strong families.21 He reminded them
of his commitment to tort reform, requesting that the legislature enact laws to “put a meaningful
cap on punitive damages” and end “frivolous and junk lawsuits” which hampered economic
development.22 Bush spoke at length about “home rule” for local school districts. He also
reiterated his desire to see tough reforms to the criminal justice system, both to instill discipline
and “strong values” in juvenile offenders and to ensure that violent adult offenders remained
behind bars.23 Continuing along this conservative line, he called for changes to the welfare

discussed beliefs (relating his understanding that, according to the New Testament, God allowed only those who
“accept[ed] Christ as one’s savior” into heaven) Richards “ran ads in a Jewish newspaper that pointedly stated—
Bush says you cannot go to heaven,” costing him votes. George W. Bush, “Commitment to the Vision.” Speech,
Westlake Hills Presbyterian Church Congregation Banquet, Austin, TX, 3 Nov. 1996, 1, Box 2002/151-167, Texas
Governor George W. Bush Executive Office speeches, Archives and Information Services Division, Texas State
Library and Archives Commission.
20
Bush won by 350,000 votes. Paul Burka, “More power to him,” Texas Monthly 23, No. 2 (Feb. 1995): 116.
21
George W. Bush, “State of the State,” State of Texas, Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of
Texas, 74th Legislature, 7 Feb. 1995, 322-23. Available from:
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/govdocs/George%20W%20Bush/1995/SOS_Bush_1995.pdf
22
Ibid, 323.
23
Ibid, 324-25.
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system “to encourage work and initiative” and to “break the cycle of dependency” of those
seeking aid from the state by placing limits on the benefits available to them.24
Though Bush joked that reporters had grown tired of hearing him repeat these four core
objectives in every speech, the clarity and framing of his legislative agenda is significant. His
claim that “my guiding principle will be government if necessary, but not necessarily
government,” along with his emphasis on traditional (though not specifically religious) values,
endeared him to Republicans as well as conservative Democrats.25 Bush achieved considerable
success in carrying out his domestic agenda, moving all four initiatives forward within his first
one hundred days as governor.26 One journalist commented that Bush “was on a winning streak
that seemed likely to last through the legislative session. No first-term governor in memory has
had such a high batting average on issues of such importance.”27 Perhaps most noteworthy, with
the exception of one line in his inaugural address where he declared that the responsibilities of
the governor’s office “can best be met with the guidance of One greater than ourselves,”
nowhere in his initial public statements as governor did Bush utilize religious tropes to appeal to
Texans.28 Political rather than religious values informed his rhetoric in his first term as governor.
So, too, did achieving his conservative aims through bipartisan cooperation, an effort that
reflected the political sympathies of Texans in the mid-1990s as well as the relative lack of

24

Ibid, 325.
George W. Bush, “Inaugural Address,” State of Texas, Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of
Texas, 74th Legislature, 17 Jan. 1995, 36. Available from:
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/govdocs/George%20W%20Bush/1995/IA_Bush_1.17.95.pdf See also: George
W. Bush, “A Budget Policy Message to the Seventy-Fourth Legislature Assembled in Regular Session,” 15 Feb.
1995. Available from:
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/govdocs/George%20W%20Bush/1995/BudgetPolicyMessage021595.pdf
26
R.G. Ratcliffe, “Away from the spotlight, governor makes his mark,” Houston Chronicle, 15 Apr. 1995, A1.
27
Paul Burka, “Four for four,” Texas Monthly 23, No. 6 (June 1995): 106.
28
Bush, “Inaugural Address,” 35. That said, in its coverage of the Inaugural Address, the Houston Chronicle did
include a quote from an interview with Bush in which he stated he intended “to be part of a catalyst for cultural
change,” which the reporter interpreted as evidence that Bush’s focus on personal responsibility signified his belief
that “God and government help those who help themselves.” R.G. Ratcliffe, “Bush aims to be catalyst for wide
cultural change,” Houston Chronicle, 15 Jan. 1995, A1.
25
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power Texas governors held over the legislature.29 During his first term, Bush had to work
closely with Democratic Lieutenant Governor Bob Bullock in order to succeed in achieving his
legislative agenda. In early 1996, U.S. News and World Report wrote that Bush, with the support
of Bullock and Democratic Speaker of the House Pete Laney, had “passed a school-reform bill
that removed most state controls on local districts, a welfare reform measure that allowed greater
local innovation, a juvenile-justice law with tougher sentencing and a tort-reform bill changing
the rules that made Texas a trial lawyer's paradise,” all while keeping spending and taxes low. 30
Although his policies as governor fell squarely within conservative political orthodoxy, Bush
broke somewhat with national Republican ideology in seeking to foster trade with Mexico and
adopt moderate immigration policies.31 In this manner, he continued his efforts to appeal to the
Texas Republicans, conservative Democrats, and independent voters who elected him governor
by focusing narrowly on state issues.32 Yet, by January 1997, reporters had begun to proclaim
that “the honeymoon” between Bush and his erstwhile Democratic partners “is definitely,
irrevocably, terminally over.”33 His legislative victories had sown the seeds of discontent.
Bush’s success in enacting the conservative policies he promoted in his gubernatorial
campaign also garnered him attention nationally as a potential Republican nominee for the 2000

On the political leanings of Texans during Bush’s campaign for and first term as governor, see Lois Romano and
George Lardner Jr., “Bush’s Move Up to the Majors,” Washington Post, 31 Jul. 1999: A1; on Texas’ constitutional
limits to the power of the governor, see McCall, The Power, 132.
30
Michael Barone, “Best little governor in Texas,” U.S. News and World Report, 1 Jan. 1996.
31
Bush viewed Mexico as “‘crucial’ to the Texas economy,” and sought to improve business relations between the
two countries, while also adopting “a strict stand on border enforcement but a compassionate, or at least pragmatic,
view of those who slip through.” Indeed, when President Bill Clinton met with the nation’s governors in January
1995 to garner support for his proposal to rescue the ailing Mexican economy through a federal loan guarantee,
Bush jumped to his defense. Despite outcry from Republicans outside of Texas, Bush expressed concern that
without the loan guarantee the value of the peso would decline, hurting the Texas economy and potentially leading
to increased illegal immigration. See Scott Pendleton, “Stetson-Size Agenda for Texas,” Christian Science Monitor
(15 Dec. 1994), 2; “Mexico / Aid / Clinton,” NBC Evening News (20 Jan. 1995), Vanderbilt Television News
Archive. Available from: http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/program.pl?ID=602688; “Buchanan: Gets a Strong Warning
from George W. Bush,” National Journal Hotline, 16 Aug. 1995.
32
Pendleton, 2.
33
Paul Burka, “The honeymoon is over,” Texas Monthly 25, No. 1 (Jan. 1997): 134.
29
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presidential election.34 Aware of this, Bush developed his agenda for the 1997 Texas legislative
session with an eye toward attracting GOP support, focusing his attention on tax reform and
faith-based initiatives.35
The salience of these issues in national politics, and, therefore, in the matrix of
calculations for a presidential run, reflected the Republican Party’s success by the mid-1990s in
building public support for limited government and in “capitaliz[ing] on concerns in large sectors
of society about changing social and sexual mores.”36 This ideological shift, along with
conservative coalition-building efforts that included the cultivation of the religious right as a
reliable voting bloc, contributed to the Republican Party’s dramatic return to Congressional
power in 1994.37 Furthermore, although scholars have downplayed the influence that Newt
Gingrich’s Contract with America had on voters in the 1994 midterm elections, the issues that
Gingrich emphasized as Speaker of the House reinvigorated the Republican base and helped the
party navigate longstanding tensions between fiscal and social conservatives.38 Yet the
34

Ibid.
Gregory Curtis, “Scattered applause,” Texas Monthly 25, No. 3 (Mar. 1997): 7; McCall, 124.
36
Nicol C. Rae, Conservative Reformers: The Republican Freshmen and the Lessons of the 104th Congress
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 209-10. Rae argues that “by the early 1990s, the conservative critique that [the]
incremental expansion of government [over the previous forty years under Democratic Congressional control] was
largely responsible for ballooning federal deficits had become conventional wisdom among the public.” He also
notes that Republicans made political hay of the moral and ethical scandals that plagued Democrats this period.
37
Julian Zelizer suggests that these efforts revealed the fits and starts of conservative realignment and power in
Congress in the 1990s, and highlights tensions between conservative factions within the Republican Party. Zelizer,
“Reflections,” 373-75. On conservatism and the Republican Revolution in 1994, see Critchlow, The Conservative
Ascendancy, 221, 240-43, 254-77; Daniel J. Balz and Ronald Brownstein, Storming the Gates: Protest Politics and
the Republican Revival (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996); Rae, 27-61; John J. Coleman, “Clinton and the Party System
in Historical Perspective,” in The Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton's Legacy In U.S. Politics, ed. Steven E.
Schier (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 151-52. On the conservative realignment and the religious
right, see D. Michael Lindsay, “Ties That Bind and Divisions That Persist: Evangelical Faith and the Political
Spectrum,” American Quarterly 59, No. 3, Religion and Politics in the Contemporary United States (Sept. 2007):
901-02; Wade Clark Roof, “American Presidential Rhetoric from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush: Another Look
at Civil Religion,” Social Compass 56, No. 2 (2009): 299.
38
Zelizer, 373-75; Rae, 59-61; Randall Strahan and Daniel J. Palazzolo, “The Gingrich Effect,” Political Science
Quarterly 119, No. 1 (Spring 2004): 89-114; Gary C. Jacobson, “The 1994 House Election in Perspective,” Political
Science Quarterly 111 (Summer 1996): 203-23; Paul Frymet et al, “Party Elites, Ideological Voters and Divided
Party Government,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22 (May 1997): 195-216; John B. Bader, Taking the Initiative:
Leadership Agendas in Congress and the "Contract with America" (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,
1996), 171-205.
35
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Republican Revolution did more than just reify tax cuts and small government as conservative
orthodoxy. As part of a plan to cut welfare programs, Gingrich introduced Congress to the work
of University of Texas journalism professor Marvin Olasky, who advocated private and faithbased initiatives to provide social services to the poor.39 Olasky proved profoundly influential in
shaping Bush’s thinking about welfare reform in Texas and in the development of his
“compassionate conservative” political philosophy.40 The ascendancy of conservative
Republicans in Congress and the injection of their ideology into public discourse primed Bush
and other Republican political contenders to focus on these issues, which had demonstrated
efficacy in mobilizing voters.41
While the policies that Bush pursued during his first two years as governor centered on
issues that appealed to Republicans as well as moderate and conservative Democrats, the tax
plans that he unveiled in 1997 and 1999 highlighted the ideological divide between the parties
and revealed Bush’s mounting efforts to build up his national standing.42 In his 1997 State of the
State address, Bush underscored the notable economic growth that Texas had experienced under

In his first speech as speaker of the House, Gingrich cited Olasky’s book, The Tragedy of American Compassion.
In subsequent discussions of welfare reform and the Contract with America, Republicans referenced Olasky’s work
frequently. See Newt Gingrich, “Election of Speaker,” Congressional Record 141:1 (4 Jan. 1995), H3; House
Committee on Ways and Means, Contract with America—Overview, 104th cong., 1st sess., Jan. 1995; Hilary Stout,
“A Texas Professor's History of Poverty Programs Has Made Him the Darling of Conservative Elite,” Wall Street
Journal, 20 Mar. 1995, A16.
40
Karl Rove provided Bush with a copy of Olasky’s book, and Bush and Olasky met in person and began
developing a close relationship in 1995 when the two swept in to save the Christian drug rehabilitation program
Teen Challenge from closure due to alleged state safety code violations. Olasky subsequently provided guidance to
the Advisory Task Force on Faith-based Community Service Groups that Bush set up in 1996; by 1999, Bush had
appointed Olasky to chair his policy subcommittee on religion. Bush also wrote an approving introduction to
Olasky’s Compassionate Conservatism: What It Is, What It Does, and How It Can Transform America, published in
July, 2000. See David Grann, “Where W. Got Compassion,” New York Times, 12 Sept. 1999; David Harris, “New
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his governorship, announcing that “we face no immediate legal or fiscal crisis.”43 The state
boasted a substantial budget surplus, and as such, Bush proposed implementing “a billion dollar
tax cut” to return some of this surplus to taxpayers through reduced property taxes.44 He also
called for a “fair and reasonable” tax on businesses to fund increased spending for education.45 In
this manner, Bush drew on popular conservative economic rhetoric to promote his policies,
emphasizing savings to taxpayers, friendliness to small businesses, and offsets to balance new
spending. Nevertheless, the state legislature rejected most of the plan, save for cuts to property
taxes.46 Media coverage of the response to his address highlighted Democratic disenchantment
with Bush and his new legislative agenda. One article suggested that Democrats in the Texas
House and Senate viewed his plan as a political move to “[position] himself to compete with
other Republican governors . . . who have already cut taxes and spending in their states.”47 In A
Charge to Keep, Bush asserted that he had not yet begun considering a run for the presidency as
of the 1997 legislative session.48 Whether or not this is true, he made tax reform a key part of his
successful campaign for re-election as governor in 1998 and, in January 1999, he called on the
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Texas legislature to implement another $2 billion in tax cuts.49 Six months later, Bush announced
his candidacy for president. At that point, appealing to Republican voters outside of Texas had
become paramount, and, as journalists James Moore and Wayne Slater note, the tax agenda he
laid out in 1999 had “a strong ideological bent guaranteed to find favor among Republican
primary voters.”50 By publicizing his desire to use part of the state’s budget surplus to provide
tax relief, rather than to increase state spending as some Democrats may have preferred, Bush
affirmed his commitment to pursuing conservative policies and built support within the national
Republican Party.51
Although Bush’s property tax relief plan attracted the most attention from the media, his
proposal to reduce welfare spending in Texas by easing regulations and oversight of faith-based
charities marked the beginning of a key shift in how he expressed his political philosophy
publicly. In his 1997 State of the State address, Bush called for reforms “to make sure our
welfare system changes behavior,” but asked that new legislation do so “in a compassionate
way.”52 To accomplish this, Bush urged the legislators to act on the “Faith in Action” report that
his Advisory Task Force on Faith-based Community Service Groups had written in late 1996. He
outlined the vision presented in the report, stating:
Many organizations in Texas, faith-based groups, want to do more to help their fellow Texans. They want
to follow their hearts, but fear bureaucratic rules and regulations will stifle their souls and threaten the
religious nature of their mission. Our laws and rules in Texas should encourage people to help. . . . [‘Faith
in Action’] is a blueprint that outlines how government can encourage people of faith to help people get off
and stay off welfare. Our society faces many tough problems. It’s time to seek, not shun, divine help.53
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The authors of the “Faith in Action” report argued that while government should continue
to provide services to the needy, it should not “cling to the statist belief that it has exclusive
jurisdiction for the poor,” particularly since the “the faith community” had a scripturally based
responsibility to “tend to people’s temporal as well as heavenly needs.”54 The report suggested
that faith-based organizations in Texas could address the state’s most pressing social ills more
effectively than could government. It argued that while the state could not change the “human
character. . . . Some of our worst social pathologies (e.g., illegitimacy, crime, poverty) can be
solved if people experience spiritual transformation.”55 The report advocated a “charitable
choice” provision for the Texas welfare system, based on a similar measure that John Ashcroft
had introduced and passed in the U.S. Senate in 1996, which would allow the needy the option of
receiving aid from a faith-based charity rather than a state program.56 It also called for a clause to
protect the religious liberties of faith-based groups and the methods used in their programs.57
The “Faith in Action” proposal expanded Bush’s commitment to conservative political
principles (such as reducing dependence on state-provided welfare) into a comprehensive vision
for enacting broader cultural change. For obvious reasons, the proposal appealed to Christian
conservatives. Given his political ambitions and the reality that evangelicals had made steady
progress amassing political clout in the Republican Party, promoting “Faith in Action” seemed
pragmatic, as it helped bridge the gap between social and economic conservative principles. In
the speeches he made to churches about his efforts to pass a faith-based initiatives bill, Bush
stressed his belief in the separation of church and state, much as he had during his gubernatorial
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campaign.58 However, in contrast to 1994, Bush explained the underlying philosophy behind his
sentiments in greater detail. His concerns about church-state cooperation did not stem from a fear
that injecting religion into politics might erode democracy. Rather, Bush stated that he valued the
separation of church and state because “anytime the church enters the realm of politics the
church runs the real risk of losing its mission, the teaching of the word of God.”59 Furthermore,
he explained that he disapproved of politicians who used their faith to cast themselves as godlier
than their opponents because he viewed this as “contradictory to the teachings of the Lord.”60
According to Bush, the “Faith in Action” proposal protected the mission of the church while
allowing religious groups to perform the vital services that he believed the government could
not—and should not—provide.
As Bush worked to promote the Faith-Based Bill that developed out of the “Faith in
Action” recommendations (Texas HB 21, HB 2481, HB 2482, and SCR 44), his rhetoric about
the proper role and capabilities of government evolved. Bush’s speeches on the bill recalled but
expanded upon statements he had made during his first gubernatorial campaign. He maintained
that government had a role to play in addressing social problems, but added that the state could
not provide a comprehensive solution because “government can’t make people love one another.
. . . only faith can do that.”61 At the Texas Legislative Prayer Breakfast in February 1997, Bush
told lawmakers that, although he believed in the separation of church and state, “in the world of
politics, it helps to be a believer, to have core convictions and principles, on which to base your
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decisions. And the Bible’s a pretty good political handbook.”62 He continued by stressing that he
had made it his mission as governor to harness the power of believers and their principles to
solve the social ills that plagued Texas through the Faith-Based Bill. Bush told his audience:
I am convinced that to fundamentally and permanently change our culture, we must have a renewal of spirit
in our country. One of the biggest challenges in our culture came when people turned away from God, and
lost touch with our bedrock values that have stood the test of time: Love your neighbor. Give an honest
day’s work for an honest day’s wages. Don’t lie, cheat, or steal. Respect others, respect their opinions,
respect their property. And always remember, you are responsible for what you say and what you do. 63

This statement, while entirely in line with the core principles that Bush had advocated during his
time as governor, exemplifies the transformation of his rhetoric that had occurred by the end of
1996. It reveals the clear influence of conservative intellectuals, particularly Marvin Olasky, on
his thinking and shows that he, with guidance from advisors Karl Rove and Karen Hughes,
leveraged the broad appeal of these views to frame his policies for maximum political return.64
The success of the bill, and the national attention that it garnered for Bush, ensured that this new
faith-infused language about cultural change and “bedrock values” would become a hallmark of
his future speeches and stated political philosophy.
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Indeed, Bush began to incorporate the religious rhetoric that he had used to secure the
passage of the Faith-Based bill into speeches on other issues. This language, along with his
legislative achievements and the “growing support among conservative circles” for the types of
faith-based initiatives that he had implemented in Texas, helped him amass a national political
following.65 In August 1997, Bush delivered a speech entitled “The Future of America” to the
Midwest Republican Leadership Conference. The speech laid out a vision for the Republican
Party based on the issues he had tackled as governor. He stressed that all Republicans shared “a
conservative philosophy that is fair and decent and compassionate,” a philosophy based on fiscal
responsibility and limited government.66 More significantly, he repeated, verbatim, the
sentiments about the need for “a renewal of spirit” in America that he had expressed at the Texas
Legislative Prayer Breakfast in February.67 In this manner, he introduced his “compassionate
conservative” political philosophy in fully developed form to a national audience, merging the
conservative views he had espoused during his gubernatorial campaign with the religious
rhetoric that had become so effective politically in Texas in recent months. Making this
philosophy the lynchpin of his remarks at such visible and politically significant events as the
Midwest Republican Leadership Conference and the 1998 Republican Governors Association
meeting allowed Bush to build his national reputation while avoiding other, more polarizing
conservative issues.68
Bush had incorporated Christian language into his public statements gradually and
experimentally over the course of his first term as governor; the blend of evangelical rhetoric and
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conservative orthodoxy that had crystallized in his philosophy of compassionate conservatism by
1997 emerged only because he found that this formulation resonated with voters. In particular,
Bush and advisors Karl Rove and Karen Hughes had discovered the power of faith-based
initiatives and religious language to win support from African-Americans and Hispanics, two
groups that traditionally voted for Democratic candidates, without alienating Republicans.69 In a
press conference delivered in a mix of Spanish and English after his re-election in 1998, Bush
attributed his landslide victory to the broad appeal of his political philosophy, stating:
‘I showed Texans, I showed people who pay attention to politics, that one can adhere to the conservative
philosophy and implement policies that are compassionate for our fellow Texans. I believe I showed people
that you can adhere to a conservative philosophy and win a sizable portion of the Hispanic vote and close
the gender gap.’70

Reports from the election bore out his analysis, as “exit polls showed that Bush won 49 percent
of Hispanics, up 21 percentage points from 1994. Among women, he got 65 percent, up 15
points. . . . Bush even appealed to more black voters, jumping 12 points to 27 percent.”71
In A Charge to Keep, Bush explained his embrace of faith-based initiatives as a pragmatic
response to government overreach, an example, along with the major tax cuts he implemented, of
his transformative leadership in Texas.72 Clearly, promoting faith-based initiatives also paid him
tremendous political dividends.
By 1998, the media had started to speculate in earnest about his presidential ambitions.
National Republican strategists, eager to avoid a repeat of the party’s electoral defeat and poor
performance among Hispanics, African Americans, and women during the 1996 Dole campaign,
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recognized Bush’s potential to revitalize the image of the Republican Party.73 In addition to
building new constituencies, his religious rhetoric also won him growing attention from the
Christian Right, a crucial Republican voting bloc. Bush recognized the political importance of
maintaining and expanding his ties to the evangelical community. In an NBC Evening News
report in June, 1998, anchor Tom Brokaw noted that although Bush denied he had plans to seek
the Republican nomination for the upcoming election, he had begun “consulting regularly with
Ralph Reed, the strategist who once ran the Christian Coalition.”74 According to Brokaw, Bush
said “he dismisses suggestions the GOP is tilting heavily to the Christian conservative agenda,”
though the change in his own political rhetoric belied this assertion.75 In interviews, Reed
asserted that the eventual Republican nominee would need to “unite economic and religious
conservatives,” in order to win the presidency.76 Bush seems to have taken this insight to heart in
his campaign for governor in 1998 and the presidency in 2000.
When Bush won the 1998 gubernatorial election with nearly 70% of the vote, he thanked
his constituents for their support and for providing him with a mandate to continue to implement
his “compassionate conservative” policies. In his election night speech, he promised:
I will continue to work to change our culture from one that has said if it feels good do it and blame
someone else if you have a problem, to a new culture where every Texan understands that each of us must
be responsible for our actions, our families, and for loving our neighbors as we would like to be loved
ourselves.77
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This speech repeated the rhetoric about cultural change, personal responsibility, and the golden
rule that had become his standard talking points by late 1998. Expanding upon these points in his
Inaugural Address, Bush alluded to Genesis when he explained that “all of us have worth. We’re
all made in the image of God,” and, with the help of “decent, caring people who heard the call to
love their neighbors as they would like be loved themselves,” all citizens “have an equal chance
to succeed.”78 He added that democracy could not flourish without “educating our children about
their moral and civil responsibilities,” which included living by the Christian values he
promoted, explicitly, in this inaugural address.79 Bush concluded by declaring, “My fellow
Texans, as we head into a new century, Texas lives on the sunrise side of the mountain,” an
obscure biblical reference he would repeat again and again in later speeches.80 Bush thus used
the 1999 inaugural address as an opportunity to begin to incorporate scriptural references into his
political philosophy.
Intending to build on the success he had experienced in his first term by focusing on
similar core issues, Bush made tax cuts and the passage of the Texas Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, which complemented the Faith-Based Bill, major legislative priorities for his
second term.81 In introducing the Religious Freedom Act, Bush announced, “One of my missions
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as Governor is to help foster an environment where people of faith and goodwill can express
their faith and love their neighbors without fear of government intrusion or intervention.”82 After
reiterating these sentiments at the “Faith, Family, and Freedom Conference” at the Great Hills
Baptist Church in March 1999, Bush celebrated the progress he had made in promoting faithbased initiatives, claiming: “faith is changing Texas. Little armies of compassion are
transforming our state one heart, one soul and one conscience at a time.”83 The repetitive nature
of his speeches speaks to the extent to which these tropes had shaped and gradually transformed
his public political philosophy and image by 1999. This, in conjunction with the increasing
frequency with which he utilized specific scriptural references, indicates that Bush recognized
the political appeal of this type of rhetoric, and made use of it to advance his career. This is not
to suggest that he lacked a genuine faith in Christianity. Rather, based on the care he took in his
first run for governor to avoid discussing his evangelicalism, it seems his willingness to inject
faith into his policies varied depending on the direction of political winds and the growing power
of evangelical Christians within the Republican Party.
The fact that, after announcing his intention to seek the Republican nomination in March
1999, Bush began to share his previously un-discussed salvation experience in his speeches and
writing provides further evidence that, by 1999, he saw the political utility of connecting with the
evangelical Republican base. Indeed, in both of his memoirs (A Charge to Keep and Decision
Points), Bush devotes several pages to describing the spiritual rebirth he experienced between
1985 and 1986, which he depicts as an awakening that transformed his life and his outlook
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entirely.84 The experience of personal salvation is a fundamental part of evangelical Christianity,
and sharing the story of one’s salvation plays an important role in the process of spreading the
gospel and inculcating faith. Perhaps because of this, most salvation narratives share common
tropes and follow prescribed patterns.85 In his memoirs, Bush’s description of his tortuous road
to finding Jesus fits the archetypal salvation narrative. He cites his days of hard drinking as his
low point, then describes a dinner with evangelist Billy Graham as the key event that “planted a
mustard seed in my soul” and led to his redemption.86 Yet David C. Bailey has argued that the
narrative Bush provides in A Charge to Keep is a highly modified version of his actual salvation
experience, and that as such it demonstrates Bush’s calculated efforts during his first presidential
campaign to appeal to evangelical voters and signal his “divine commission” to run for
president.87 Indeed, newspaper articles from his first gubernatorial campaign that discuss his
decision to quit drinking do not even mention his Christianity or salvation experience as an
impetus for the decision.88 This is significant as it lends credence to the idea that Bush began to
incorporate religious tropes into his public speeches strategically.89 Furthermore, given the
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strategic release of the book as a campaign tool, Bush’s presentation of his salvation experience
demonstrates that he and his advisors recognized the need to secure evangelical support in order
to win the presidency.
Even after George W. Bush officially announced his intention to seek the Republican
nomination to run for president, he still had to work hard to convince the most conservative
members of the party that he would represent their interests. Though he marketed himself as an
evangelical Republican who would stick to “core conservative principals,” some worried that he
might be too moderate in his views.90 For example, though pro-life, some of his stances on
abortion policy raised concerns. As one reporter noted, when “Bush said there will be no litmus
test on abortion, meaning, he might appoint pro-choice judges to the Supreme Court . . .
Conservative rivals pounced.”91 His reluctance to define a clear platform until late in the
nominating process may have contributed to these concerns, though it did not stop Bush from
emerging as the clear front-runner, or from raising substantially more money than any other
potential nominee raised. Indeed, holding off on announcing his platform made good political
sense. As another reporter noted, “in truth, Bush’s basic positions are well known: he’s a taxcutting, anti-abortion, pro-business, pro-school vouchers conservative. A compassionate
conservative, as he likes to say.”92 By refraining from providing too many details, he managed to
garner the support of moderates in both parties, emerging as a candidate that Republicans
believed would unite and expand their party and retake the White House.93
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Interestingly, when Bush finally did outline his political priorities in the Republican
debates, he did not utilize much religious rhetoric to promote his policy proposals. He selected a
handful of core issues to focus on, including education, trade, faith-based initiatives, social
security, and tax reform, much as he had during his first run for governor.94 On foreign policy,
Bush sought to make up for serious gaffes he had made in early public statements by attempting
to “[portray] himself as a clear-eyed realist, rejecting ‘the blinders of isolationism,’ and warning
that Russia and especially China, with its increasing military strength, are potential enemies, who
Bush said must be treated as looming rivals, not friends.”95 In discussing domestic issues, Bush
emphasized his record as governor, citing his support for “home rule” of local schools and
asserting that, as president, he would “encourage faith-based institutions and organizations that
help people in need” just as he had in Texas.96 Yet, at least in this debate, he did not utilize the
tropes about faith-based initiatives that he had relied on during his terms as governor. Republican
strategists hoped that focusing on faith-based initiatives in this way would help the party pick up
crucial independent and minority voters.97
Still, when addressing religious voters, rather than a national audience, Bush reverted to
using faith-based rhetoric to garner support. In a speech at the Christian Coalition’s “Road to
Victory” conference, Bush stressed that his compassionate conservative agenda included a strong
opposition to abortion, as well as deep desire to help the less fortunate.98 He also noted that
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“sometimes the influence of faith is ignored or dismissed. Sometimes, in our society, it seems
like a weak flame in a strong wind. In reality, it is the ‘shadow of a mighty rock in a weary
land.’”99 Returning to familiar rhetorical territory, he reminded supporters of faith-based
initiatives that “individuals are responsible to love our neighbors as we want to be loved
ourselves,” because government did not have the capacity to solve the social ills that plagued
American society.100 Senator John McCain, a fellow contender for the Republican nomination,
criticized Bush for seeking the support of well-known evangelical leaders Pat Robertson and
Jerry Falwell (whom he referred to as the “‘Agents of Intolerance’”), accusing him of pandering
to the religious right.101 Evangelicals reacted angrily to McCain’s denunciations, which
contributed to his undoing as a potential candidacy.102 Bush, on the other hand, received a
considerable boost from evangelicals, in part because they identified deeply with his religious
and cultural cues.103
Despite criticism from his opponents, Bush secured the Republican nomination and, after
a divisive and contested general election, the presidency.104 In the campaign against Al Gore,
Bush doubled-down on his compassionate conservative rhetoric, hoping that this would gain him
allegiance from Hispanic, African-American, and conservative Christian and Catholic voters.105
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He and Gore alike latched on to faith-based initiatives in order to appeal to swing voters.106 This,
according to scholarship on the campaign, highlighted key changes in the American political
landscape by 2000, specifically growing disillusionment with the ability of the government to
effect change, increased acceptance of religion in the public square, and the electorate’s focus on
social issues.107 The latter two developments had grown out of the rise of the religious right as a
political force beginning in the 1980s.108 Although Bush lost the popular vote, he and his
advisors believed that continuing to build and sustain ties with conservative Christians had and
would continue to pay off politically.109 The devout Christian and compassionate conservative
political identity that Bush had crafted gradually over the course of his governorship became one
of the defining elements of his presidency.
On the whole, the speeches and public statements that George W. Bush gave while
running for and serving as Governor of Texas, as well as while running for the presidency, reveal
that his use of religious rhetoric evolved over time. Though he largely avoided discussing
religion during his first gubernatorial campaign, he grew progressively more comfortable
referencing his faith when discussing policy, particularly after announcing his desire to promote
faith-based initiatives in 1996. For the most part, he relied on a small set of interrelated tropes to
explain and gain support for his policies: For Bush, the dignity and value of every human life,
each created in God’s image, necessitated that individuals love one another as they want to be
loved themselves. Bush’s “compassionate conservative” philosophy—including his emphasis on
personal responsibility and the desirability of having faith-based charities, rather than the state,
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provide care to the needy—emerged from these core tropes. Thus long before he became
president, religious rhetoric shaped Bush’s political thought and speeches.
That said, few of the tropes that Bush utilized in speeches prior to his presidency took on
the messianic and crusading tones of his rhetoric after 9/11. Although during the Republican
debates in 1999, Bush did state that “our nation’s greatest export to the world has been, is, and
always will be [our] incredible freedoms,” he did not link this sentiment with his religious beliefs
in any clear or explicit manner. Nor did he discuss the concept of “freedom” in this sense much
(if at all) during his two terms as governor. Bush’s rhetoric about “freedom” as God’s gift to the
world, and about the United States’ corresponding responsibility to spread democracy abroad,
appeared suddenly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.110 This is not to say that the links he drew
between freedom and Christianity have no roots in scripture or American religious history. As
Robert Wuthnow notes, “the emphasis on freedom in American Christianity derives from the
gospel’s assertion that following Christ makes one spiritually free. A redeemed person is a
liberated person.”111
Although Bush did not draw on this connection between Christian beliefs and the
American concept of freedom prior to 2001, it is possible that his experiences as governor
incorporating religious rhetoric into his political philosophy and forging connections with
religious leaders shaped his response to 9/11. His deep personal faith and comfort with utilizing
religious tropes to explain his political agenda may help to illuminate why he latched onto faithbased language when reaching for a way to understand and describe the new world that he
believed the United States faced on September 12, 2001. Ultimately, it is the salience of religion
and religious language in American politics in this period and the Republican Party’s desire to
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capture new constituencies that best explains Bush’s embrace of Christian rhetoric during his
campaigns and presidency. Bush had evinced a deep and genuine evangelical faith for years
before he launched his bid for governor, yet at the start of his political career, he downplayed the
role that religion played in shaping his views and policy agenda. As Republicans at the state and
national level struggled to meld the competing interests of different conservative factions and
independent voters, Bush found success governing Texas by doing just that. Over time, he
discovered that cloaking his conservative economic values with compassionate religious
language gave him a political edge in Texas, allowing him to win substantial support among
minorities, women, and conservative Democrats. By 1998, he had recognized the potential that
this rhetoric had to make the GOP a “big tent” party, and carried that realization with him to the
White House.

